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PREVIEW; State v. Staker: The Constitutionality of
Undercover Law Enforcement Text Message Conversations with
Potential Suspects
Forrest Crowl*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
arguments in the matter of State of Montana v. Travis Staker on
Friday, March 26, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Oral arguments will be
conducted entirely by visual and audio communication devices on
Zoom, live-streamed through the Court’s website at
http://stream.vision.net/MT-JUD/, with an introduction to the oral
arguments beginning at 9:00 a.m. Mark J. Luebeck will likely
appear on behalf of Appellant Travis Staker (“Staker”), and Mardell
Ployhar will likely appear on behalf of Appellee the State of
Montana (“State”).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The primary issues before the Montana Supreme Court are
whether Staker has an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his
cell phone text message communications and whether society is
willing to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. The
Court’s decision will clarify whether a warrant is required for an
undercover law enforcement officer to engage in text message
conversations with a potential suspect. This decision will potentially
clarify the extent of privacy rights in text message conversations
between private citizens and undercover law enforcement agents.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

During the last week of August 2018, Special Agent Rodney
Noe, from the Department of Homeland Security, posted an
advertisement on Internet websites advertising an “experience” with
an individual named “Lily.”1 The advertisement provided
individuals with an email address and a phone number that could be

* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana, Class of 2022.
1
Brief of Appellant at 3–4, State v. Staker, (Mont. Apr. 4, 2020) (No. 19-0731).
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used to contact “Lily.”2 Agent Noe possessed the cell phone that
received and responded to inquiries related to the advertisement.3
Agent Noe, acting in an undercover capacity as “Lily,” began text
messaging individuals who responded to the advertisement.4
On August 27, 2018, Agent Noe received a text message
from Staker’s cell phone.5 Staker and “Lily” engaged in a text
message conversation where Staker arranged to meet “Lily” at a
Bozeman hotel and pay her in exchange for sexual intercourse.6 The
parties stipulated that abbreviations Staker used in the text messages
with “Lily” were consistent with common abbreviations used in the
sex trade.7 On August 29, 2018, when Staker arrived at the hotel, he
was arrested and charged with misdemeanor prostitution in violation
of Montana Code Annotated § 45–5–601.8 The State did not seek or
obtain a search warrant during the course of its investigation of
Staker.9
In Gallatin County Justice Court, Staker was granted his
motion to suppress the evidence of the text messages he sent to
Agent Noe on the ground that the officer’s recording of the text
messages violated Staker’s right to privacy under Article II, Sections
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.10 The State appealed the
justice court’s decision to the Eighteenth Judicial District Court,
where Staker again moved to suppress the evidence obtained
without a warrant by Agent Noe.11 On September 17, 2019, the
district court denied Staker’s motion to suppress, concluding:
“Agent Noe did not engage in a search or seizure of the text
2

Brief of Appellee at 2–3, State v. Staker, (Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) (No. 19-0731).
Id. at 3.
4
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 4–7.
7
Id. at 6.
8
Id. at 1, 8; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–601 (“[T]he offense of
prostitution is committed if a person engages in or agrees or offers to engage in
sexual intercourse or sexual contact that is direct and not through clothing with
another person for compensation, whether the compensation is received or to be
received or paid or to be paid.”).
9
Id. at 9.
10
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1; see generally MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10
(“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”);
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
11
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.
3
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exchange with [Staker].”12 Staker subsequently entered a guilty plea
to the charge of prostitution and reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.13 This appeal followed Staker’s
sentencing.14
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Travis Staker

Staker primarily argues that Agent Noe’s warrantless
investigation constituted an illegal search and seizure, as Staker had
an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his text messages and
society recognizes his expectation as objectively reasonable.15
Staker relies on the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution,
which protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.16
Staker contends this case must be decided under Article II, Sections
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.17 Specifically, he argues, all
three factors used by Montana courts to determine whether a state
actor’s search or seizure violates the Montana Constitution are met
here.18
First, Staker claims he had an actual subjective expectation
of privacy in his cell phone text messages with “Lily.”19 Staker
characterizes his text messages to Agent Noe as “written thoughts,”
and maintains he had a subjective expectation of privacy that his
thoughts were communicated to a private person, not a government
agent.20 Staker relies on the following facts to show he had an actual
subjective expectation of privacy: he did not text publicly with
12

Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 10.
16
Id.
17
Reply Brief of Appellant at 11–19, State v. Staker, (Mont. Nov. 9, 2020) (No.
19-0731).
18
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 12; see generally State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d
489, 497–98 (Mont. 2008) (“1) whether the person challenging the state’s action
has an actual subjective expectation of privacy; 2) whether society is willing to
recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable; and 3) the nature
of the state’s intrusion.”).
19
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 17.
20
Id. at 17–18.
13
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“Lily”; he did not share their text messages with anyone and only
they had access to those conversations; they communicated using
acronyms and vague terms; he password protected his cell phone,
which only he had the ability to unlock; and he kept his cell phone
in his possession at all times and did not loan it to others.21
Next, Staker argues society recognizes his actual subjective
expectation of privacy in his text messages as reasonable.22 Here,
Staker cites to the prevalence of cell phones and society’s attitudes
toward cell phone privacy.23 Staker asserts if society recognizes an
individual’s expectation of privacy in their face-to-face
conversations, cell phone and landline voice conversations,
Facebook/cell phone messages, and physical movements, society
also recognizes Staker’s expectation of privacy in his text messages
with “Lily.”24
Lastly, Staker argues the State’s warrantless search and
seizure was per se unreasonable because the State lacked a
recognized search warrant exception.25 Staker claims the
appropriate remedy for the State’s unlawful actions is to suppress all
the evidence gathered as a result of the search, including text
messages between Staker and Agent Noe, and all testimonial
evidence regarding the communication.26

21

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 21.
23
Id. at 22–25 (citing Charles MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age,
Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
59 (2014); Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans,
GALLUP (Nov. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/29XD-LHCR; Aaron Smith,
Americans and Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 19, 2011),
https://perma.cc/S5UP-2M5H; Dustin Volz, Most Americans Unwilling to Give
Up Privacy to Thwart Attacks: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 4,
2017), https://perma.cc/4D5Q-3MXD; Matthew Weber, Reuters Graphics,
THOMSON REUTERS/ISPOS (2017), https://perma.cc/3UD3-CK94.).
24
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 31 (citing State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187
(Mont. 2012); State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010); State v. Goetz, 191
P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008); State v. Windham, Montana Eighteenth Judicial District
Court, Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Supporting January 29, 2015 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
and Dismiss (Feb. 5, 2015)).
25
Id. at 43.
26
Id. at 44.
22
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B. Appellee State of Montana
The State primarily argues Staker’s text messages to Agent
Noe are not protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana
Constitution.27 The State contends Staker does not have a privacy
interest in the text messages he voluntarily sent to the undercover
officer.28
First, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the State argues
that once Staker disclosed information to another person, he no
longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.29
The State relies heavily on the third-party doctrine, arguing Staker’s
voluntary response to an unknown party via an online advertisement
demonstrates he assumed the risk the recipient would be—or would
share his text messages with—a law enforcement officer.30 The
State asserts Staker’s cell phone was not searched; instead, Staker
sent a text message to a government agent, believing the agent was
a prostitute.31
Next, the State argues Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the
Montana Constitution do not protect text messages Staker sent to an
undercover law enforcement officer.32 The State maintains that,
although the Montana Constitution offers an enhanced privacy right
that guards against warrantless electronic monitoring and
surreptitious recording, neither of those investigatory means were
used in this case.33 Specifically, the State contends the right to
privacy under the Montana Constitution does not protect the text
messages Staker sent to an undercover law enforcement officer.34
The State distinguishes Staker from prior Montana case law
involving telephonic conversations and recordings, claiming text
27

Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 26–27.
29
Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“It is
well settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities,
and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of
that information.”).
30
Id. at 13–19.
31
Id. at 19.
32
Id. at 20.
33
Id. at 20–21.
34
Id. at 26.
28
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messages, by their very nature, create a recording in the sender’s and
the recipient’s cell phone.35 The State asserts it is common
knowledge that a person receiving a text message could be a law
enforcement officer or could share the message with anyone,
including law enforcement.36
Even if Staker had a subjective expectation of privacy, the
State argues society would not view that expectation as objectively
reasonable.37 The State asserts, regardless of what Staker did with
his cell phone, he had to know the messages he sent to a number in
an advertisement would be contained in the recipient’s phone and
the recipient could do anything they wanted with those messages.38
Essentially, the State does not believe it is reasonable for a person
to expect a written electronic communication sent to a complete
stranger in response to an advertisement for illegal services would
remain private.39
Finally, the State requests the Court to decline Staker’s
invitation to dramatically expand Montana’s right to privacy,
because it would prohibit law enforcement conduct that has
routinely been accepted and drastically hinder law enforcement’s
ability to perform investigations.40
IV.

ANALYSIS

To review a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the
Court will determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous and whether the district court’s interpretation and
application of law are correct.41 First, the Court will need to
determine if a search occurred. The Court will likely find Staker did
not have an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his text
messages, and even if he did, society is not willing to recognize that
expectation as objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Court will
likely uphold the denial of Staker’s motion to suppress the evidence
obtained by law enforcement in their investigation.

35

Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 28.
37
Id. at 29.
38
Id. at 30.
39
Id. at 31–32.
40
Id. at 32.
41
State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 493 (Mont. 2008).
36
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”42 The Montana Constitution
affords citizens an even greater right to privacy than the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.43 Pursuant to Article
II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution, and State v.
Goetz44 and its progeny, Montana citizens enjoy a heightened
privacy right. Further, even the delegates to the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention were concerned with future potential
intrusions by the government into Montanan’s privacy by using
electronic monitoring and surveillance.45 A search occurs when an
individual has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy
and the individual’s expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable.46 In Montana, a
state action constitutes an “unreasonable” or “unlawful” search of
the individual if the first two factors above are met and the nature of
the state’s intrusion is unreasonable.47
A. Staker’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The Court must first address whether Staker had an actual
subjective expectation of privacy in his text messages with Agent
Noe. A significant portion of oral argument will likely be dedicated
to this question. A split of authority exists in Montana’s Eighteenth
Judicial District Court as to whether law enforcement must obtain a
search warrant before engaging in electronic communication with a
suspect. The Court in State v. Beam48 found the defendant had no
actual subjective expectation of privacy in his Facebook messages

42

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Goetz, 191 P.3d at 494.
44
191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
45
Id. at 499–500 (citing Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim
Transcript, March 7, 1972 at 1682, 1687).
46
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
47
Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497–98.
48
Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Cause No. DC-12-161B, Findings
of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order (Apr. 10, 2013).
43
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with an undercover detective.49 While State v. Windham50 found a
defendant had an actual subjective expectation of privacy in their
Facebook and text communications with an undercover detective
posing as a 16-year-old high school student.51 The Court’s holding
in Staker should clarify the contradictory authority found in
Montana’s Eighteenth Judicial District Court.
Here, it is likely the Court upholds the district court’s
rulings, following similar reasoning as the district court, even with
the heightened principles supporting Montanan’s right to privacy in
mind. The State’s third-party doctrine argument is compelling when
paired with the district court’s conclusion that sending written text
messages to another person is different from the nature of oral
communications that were the subject of prior case law Staker
cites.52 The Montana Supreme Court’s analyses in State v. Stewart53
and State v. Allen54 ostensibly recognize the application of the thirdparty doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has generally held
“when an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confident will reveal that information to the
authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit governmental use of that information.”55 It is difficult to see
how the third-party doctrine, which essentially waives a person’s
privacy right, does not apply here. Staker sent text messages to a
stranger he found on an Internet advertisement and thus took the risk
the recipient would be—or would share his text messages with—a
law enforcement officer.

49

Id.
Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting January 29, 2015 Order Granting
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss (Feb. 5, 2015).
51
Id.
52
See Goetz, 191 P.3d at 504 (holding electronic monitoring and recording of
defendant’s conversations with a confidential informant, constituted searches
subject to the warrant requirement); State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Mont.
2010) (holding the recording of a cell phone conversation at the behest of law
enforcement constituted a search); State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187, 1201 (Mont.
2012) (holding a warrantless search occurred when a detective surreptitiously
recorded the landline/cell phone conversations between the defendant and his
daughter).
53
291 P.3d 1187 (Mont. 2012).
54
241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).
55
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
50
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Also, the Montana Supreme Court could consider
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, which have held a
“[d]efendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
[text] messages he willingly, and without undue government
prompting, sent to the undercover officers.”56 Staker willingly, and
without undue government prompting, sent text messages to Agent
Noe, and therefore, likely did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his text messages.
Staker’s attempt to establish an actual subjective expectation
of privacy hinges on his cell phone usage and how he guarded the
conversations he had with “Lily.”57 However, regardless of how
carefully Staker guarded his actual cell phone and the content within
the cell phone, his expectation of privacy likely terminated upon
delivery of the text message. The Court will likely distinguish text
message conversations from recorded oral conversations, much like
the State did in their brief.58 The district court in Staker relied, in
part, on Allen, and the fact that Allen did not know his conversation
with the informant was being recorded.59 Staker is in a much
different situation than Allen, Staker likely knew or should have
known his text message conversation was recorded and
memorialized in written form. Regardless of the steps Staker took to
guard the privacy of his cell phone, the Fourth Amendment provides
no protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”60
Staker accepted the risk, when he sent the text message to a phone
number found on an Internet advertisement, that the message could
be obtained by law enforcement. Therefore, the Court will likely
conclude Staker did not have a subjective expectation of privacy.

56

United States v. Mack, 53 F. Supp. 3d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2014).
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18–19. Staker partially relies on a noncontrolling case, State v. Windham, Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court,
Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting
January 29, 2015 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss
(Feb. 5, 2015), where an undercover law enforcement officer engaged in a
Facebook message conversation with Windham. The Court found Windham had
an actual expectation of privacy in his Facebook messaging account and society
would find that expectation as reasonable.
58
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 26.
59
Id. at 28.
60
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
57
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B. Society’s Willingness to Recognize the Subjective Expectation
as Objectively Reasonable
Even if the Court were to find an actual subjective
expectation of privacy in Staker’s text messages with Agent Noe, it
is not likely to find society is willing to accept that expectation as
objectively reasonable. In Goetz and Stewart, the Court recognized
Montanans have an expectation of privacy that prevents law
enforcement from monitoring and recording conversations;
however, they do not have an expectation of privacy in the content
of their conversations because nothing precludes the listener from
repeating what was said.61
Again, regardless of what Staker did with his cell phone, he
knew the messages would be contained in the recipient’s cell phone
and the recipient could do anything they wanted with those
messages. Staker goes into detail on the prevalence of cell phone use
today to show that society is willing to accept a subjective
expectation of privacy in text messages as objectively reasonable.62
It is undisputed cell phone usage is at an all-time high and will likely
continue to grow in prevalence every year. However, cell phone use,
and an individual’s expectation of privacy in their cell phone, is
different from the expectation of privacy in text messages sent to
another individual from their cell phone. Staker’s control over the
content of the text message expires upon delivery, a concept that has
been discussed and analyzed in recent years due to increased cell
phone ownership and use.63 It is important to emphasize, Staker’s
actual cell phone was not searched without a warrant.
While Staker persuasively looks to public policy, set by the
Montana legislature through enactment of statutes, to support his
claim that society would view his subjective expectation of privacy
as objectively reasonable, the public policy Staker relies on can be
distinguished from the facts in Staker. Staker points out, in recent
years, the Montana legislature has addressed societal privacy

61

State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (Mont. 2012); State v. Goetz, 191
P.3d 489, 500 (Mont. 2008).
62
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 22–25.
63
See, e.g., State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 58 (R.I. 2014) (holding the defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages contained
in his girlfriend’s phone).
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concerns related to modern electronic data.64 Those statutes deal
primarily with the prohibition of government entities utilizing
electronic devices to access protected information found within an
individual’s personal device. But here, the State did not invade
Staker’s personal device to get incriminating information. Staker
provided the incriminating information to law enforcement when he
sent the text messages to “Lily.”
Therefore, if the Court reaches the second prong of the test,
it will likely conclude that society is not willing to recognize
Staker’s expectation of privacy in his text messages to Agent Noe
as objectively reasonable.
C. Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Brief of
Amicus Curiae
Lastly, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (“MTACDL”) filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae essentially
arguing law enforcement could have, and should have, obtained an
anticipatory warrant65 to render their actions constitutional.66 Since
the Court is not likely to conclude that a search occurred, it will
likely not address the MTACDL’s claims. However, if the Court
does reach the issue, it will likely find that anticipatory warrants may
have been used in this situation, not that one must have been used.
Ultimately, while the MTACDL’s attempt to persuade the Court to
adopt anticipatory warrants has merit, because the Court will likely
find no search occurred, no warrant would have been needed by law
enforcement, and therefore, anticipatory warrants are not required.

64

See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110 (prohibiting government entities
from obtaining from electronic devices location information, without a search
warrant); § 46-5-112 (prohibiting government entities from obtaining from
electronic devices stored data, without a search warrant); § 46-5-117 (restricting
governmental use of license plate readers).
65
“An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable
cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will
be located in a specific place.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006)
(citing and quoting 2. W. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), p. 398 (4th ed.
2004)).
66
Brief of Amicus Curiae – Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
State v. Staker, (Mont. May 9, 2020) (No. 19-0731).
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CONCLUSION

Montanans have an expectation that their oral
communications will not be recorded; however, they do not have
that same belief or guarantee that text messages, emails, or Internet
chats will not be recorded, because, by their very nature, those
communications are recorded. Therefore, it is unlikely the Court
will find an actual subjective expectation of privacy in Staker’s
communications with Agent Noe and even more unlikely the Court
will find society’s willingness to recognize that expectation as
objectively reasonable. It is unlikely the Court in Staker will extend
the reasoning of privacy in oral communications to written text
communications voluntarily sent by a defendant to law enforcement.
Therefore, the Court will likely uphold the district court’s denial of
Staker’s motion to suppress.

